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Executive Summary 
Quota management systems are now in place for the New Zealand, Tasmanian and 
South Australian rock lobster fisheries.  New Zealand was the first to move to QMS 
(1989), followed by the Southern Zone of South Australia (1993), Tasmania (1998) 
and Northern Zone South Australia (2001). 
 
Throughout the world of fisheries management, there are a number of assumptions 
made about quota management systems.  Most common are that under a QMS the 
fleet size falls, the ownership of commercial fishing access rights will concentrate and 
there will be vertical integration through the catching and processing sectors.  These 
assumed effects are made because the economic theory is that there are strong 
incentives for fishing fleets to restructure in order to become more efficient and focus 
on maximising the value of their catch as opposed to investing in inputs to maximise 
their catch.   
 
As part of a review of the system of management used for the West Coast Rock 
Lobster Fishery, a West Australian delegation visited New Zealand, Tasmania and 
South Australia in 2004 to learn more about the management systems in place for 
their respective rock lobster fisheries.   
 
Each of the fisheries visited targets the southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) and 
the delegation found that common to all these management systems is the use of a 
total allowable commercial catch (TACC) to constrain the industry’s annual catch.  
The TACC is then divided into transferable quota units held on licences that are 
renewed annually.  All fisheries complement the TACC with the use of biological 
controls, i.e. size limits and protection of animals in a breeding condition.   
 
Further analysis reveals that, beyond these common areas, the regulatory approach 
differs.  Key differences include the presence or absence of zones within the fishery; 
closed seasons; limitations on pot use; pot design and restrictions on the 
transferability of units of entitlement (both pots and quota).  
 
The delegation observed that the absence or presence of these “add on” measures 
influences the behaviour of the industry both with respect to investment and fishing 
strategy decisions.  Relevant literature supplied to the delegation supports many of 
these observations.   
 
The transition into QMS for the New Zealand, Tasmanian and South Australian 
fisheries has, on the whole, been positive.  Where the systems have been in place for a 
number of years, it is clear that the setting of a TACC can be a very effective tool for 
managing sustainability, provided that the TACC setting process is underpinned by 
quality research and reinforced by a comprehensive compliance program.   
 
Where fleet over-capacity is an issue, the move to a QMS can accelerate the process 
of restructuring when combined with a management system that allows the trade and 
lease market to function relatively freely.  
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The value of entitlements in the fishery inevitably rises.  On the one hand, this has a 
positive effect with respect to return on investment. However, it will inevitably make 
the cost of entry high.  
 
It is possible for within season price premiums to be realised through changed fishing 
behaviour when market signals are provided directly to fishers via processors.   
 
There are opportunities under QMS for participants to improve their quality of life by 
reducing the amount of time spent fishing while maintaining profitability. 
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Introduction 
 
The existing West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery management system employs a variety 
of measures.  On a broad level, the capacity of the fishery (total number of usable 
pots) is limited, thereby placing an overall cap on effort – a Total Allowable Effort 
(TAE).  Unitisation of the effort in the fishery and relatively liberal transferability 
provisions allow market forces to determine what is the most efficient use of licences 
and available entitlement (pots).  This system of management is known as an 
Individually Transferable Effort (ITE) system. 
 
The fishery is also divided into zones of access.  This distributes effort across the 
entire fishery, rather than permitting the fleet to concentrate effort on areas of 
seasonally high productivity which result in a higher than acceptable exploitation rate.  
Zonal management also enables management controls aimed at addressing zone 
specific issues to be implemented.  For example, there are currently different 
maximum size restrictions in the northern and southern regions of the fishery.   
 
A form of zonal management known as “closed areas” has also been used in a number 
of instances – Rottnest and Quobba Point closures to commercial fishing; and Fish 
Habitat Fish Protection Areas at Cottesloe, Yallingup and Lancelin Island have all 
been implemented.  There are further examples of closed areas under the marine park 
management system administered by the Department for Conservation and Land 
Management (CALM). 
 
Other management tools of note are those of a biological nature, specifically: 
protection of females in breeding condition, minimum carapace length and maximum 
carapace length.   
 
The rock lobster management system is generally recognised as successfully meeting 
key sustainability objectives, but the extent to which the fishery has optimised the 
economic and sociological benefits from the fishery are a matter of considerably more 
debate.   
 
Consequently, the Government of Western Australia committed to a review of the 
management arrangements for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery in 2003.   
 
The purpose of this review is to determine what is the best system of management for 
the fishery within the context of the established and well-documented principles of 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD)1.  Three broad categories of 
management options are being considered: (i) status quo (ii) an expanded individually 
transferable effort system; and (iii) a quota management system (QMS). 
 
Given that a QMS is a possibility, it is important to understand the experience of other 
fisheries that have adopted a QMS.   
                                                 
1 In Australia, ESD is widely recognised as a natural resource management philosophy that seeks to 
provide balance to the competing ecological, social and economic objectives associated with the 
utilisation of renewable resources.   
 
 5
Fisheries Management Paper No.212 
 
To gain an understanding of other management systems and how they have performed 
from a biological, economic and sociological perspective, a Western Australian 
delegation visited New Zealand, Tasmania, and South Australia.  The delegation 
comprised Tim Bray – Department of Fisheries; Steven Gill – Western Rock Lobster 
Council; and Ron Edwards – Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee (trip one 
only).   
 
Prior to arriving for meetings and interviews with government and industry 
representatives, two documents were sent in advance.  The first document (Appendix 
1) explained the context for the management review and the process to be followed in 
order to produce advice for government.  The second (Appendix 2) listed a series of 
“focus questions” to provide guidance on the specific information regarded most 
useful to the review process.   
 
The delegations were very warmly received at all locations, and the success of this 
exercise is due in no small part to the very helpful and hospitable way host 
government and industry representatives received the delegation.   
 
This paper reports on the delegations’ findings. It is one of four documents that the 
West Coast Rock Lobster Industry and the Western Australian Government will use 
to consider the strategic management direction for the fishery.  The other documents 
are:  
 
• An Overview of Bio-Economic, Sociological and Comparative Analyses; 
• A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the West Coast Rock 
Lobster Fishery; and 
• A Social Assessment of Coastal Communities Hosting the Western Rock 
Lobster Fishing Fleet. 
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New Zealand 
Soon after the declaration of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1978, there was a 
realisation in New Zealand that it did not have the domestic capacity to fully utilise its 
newly acquired offshore white fish resources – while inshore there was a very 
different problem.  Input management arrangements had not halted increases in 
fishing effort and, as a result, there was too much capacity to catch the sustainable 
catch(Connor, 2001). 
 
To address these issues, New Zealand adopted the Quota Management System 
(QMS), and in the mid 1980s moved the majority of its commercially significant 
fisheries into the QMS and allocated fishery specific individually transferable quotas 
(ITQs).  The rock lobster fishery joined the QMS in 1989.   
 
The rock lobster fishery was not unlike many of New Zealand’s inshore fisheries.  
Basic input controls on vessel size and numbers, combined with biological catch 
controls (minimum size and berried female protection), had not been successful at 
constraining catch and were generally regarded as promoting inefficient fishing.   
 
When the rock lobster fishery entered the QMS, it was recognised that in setting a 
TACC that would constrain the catch in each of the quota management areas there 
would be a restructure of the fleet to a lower and more efficient level. 
 
One of the underlying philosophies of New Zealand’s approach to fisheries 
management is that a rights based system is the best system in which the rights 
holders can maximise the economic returns from the sustainable use of the resource.  
 
These large changes in the fishing industry were set against the backdrop of large-
scale reform across the entire New Zealand primary production sector.  These reforms 
were designed to ensure that New Zealand industry is efficient and competitive on a 
global scale.    
  
Consistent with these reforms, it is interesting to note that the Fisheries Act 1996 does 
not explicitly contain any social objectives and consequently no data or studies on 





• Southern rock lobster, Jasus edwardsii2 
                                                 
2 There is also a small fishery for pack horse lobster. 
 7
Fisheries Management Paper No.212 
Access: 
 
• There are 487 rights holders spread over 10 quota management areas of the 
fishery.  Access rights are area specific.   
• To operate in the fishery, there is a requirement to hold at least three tonnes of 
quota and no single quota holder is permitted to hold more than 10 per cent of 
the quota in any one area. 
• Only New Zealand residents can hold quota, or companies that are not more 
than 25 per cent foreign owned. 
• Access rights have been issued in perpetuity and units of individually 
transferable quota give rise at the beginning of each season to annual catch 
entitlement (ACE) for a given area.  ACE is transferable. 
Sustainability 
 
• There is a total allowable catch (TAC) for each quota management area, the 
TAC is shared by Maori, recreational fishers and commercial fishers with an 
allowance also made for the estimated illegal take. 
• The Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) for all quota management 
areas in 2004 was 2,848 tonnes. 
• The Minister for Fisheries can adjust the TACC for a given quota management 
area to meet sustainability objectives.  In New Zealand, fisheries law 
sustainability is defined as at or above a biomass that can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield (BMSY).  In recent years, industry organisation has 
been used to voluntarily to adjust TACCs independent of government 
processes. 
• Catch is taken by pot (trap).  Fishers may use as much (or as little) gear as they 
like and there are no restrictions on pot design. 
• Catch can only be provided to a licensed fish receiver and detailed catch 
disposal records are required.  
• There is a minimum legal length for both male and female animals: 54mm and 
57mm tail width respectively. 
• Berried females cannot be taken. 
• There is no provision for quota carryover. 
Season 
 
• 1 April to 31 March – no closed season 
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Fisheries Management 
Performance against objectives of the new system 
There were two objectives stated when it was decided to move the rock lobster fishery 
into the QMS.  Specifically the objectives were: 
 
i. To limit catches to levels that will result in maximum production from the 
stock. 




The New Zealand Fisheries Act 1996 requires fish stocks to be managed so that 
stocks are at or above a biomass capable of producing the maximum sustainable yield 
(BMSY) for that particular resource.  Therefore, the first objective for rock lobster 
simply represents a desire to manage the fishery such that it can produce its MSY. 
 
There are 10 separate fisheries that collectively make up the New Zealand Rock 
Lobster Fishery, each fishery has a TAC (and TACC) and is assessed in its own right.  
Rather than detail the status of each of the 10 fisheries, two have been chosen for the 
purpose of this exercise – CRA 4 and CRA 5.  Figure 1 illustrates the area of the 
different New Zealand fisheries: CRA 4 is situated off the south-east coast of the 
North Island (Wellington – Hawkes Bay), and CRA 5 is situated off the north-east 
coast of the South Island (Canterbury / Marlborough).   
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Figure 1: Management (CRA) areas for the New Zealand Rock Lobster Fishery  
 
The New Zealand Rock Lobster Industry Council (NZRLIC) is contracted by the 
relevant government department (Ministry of Fisheries) to undertake stock 
assessments for the CRA 4 and 5 fisheries.  NZRLIC is also responsible for the 
collection of data relevant for the stock assessments.  Key performance indicators 
used in the New Zealand rock lobster fisheries include: (i) estimated biomass; and (ii) 
catch per unit effort. 
 
In the 2004 Fisheries Assessment Report, the following statement was made about 
CRA 4:  
 
These results thus suggest a stock in reasonably healthy current state, 
but one likely to decline in the near future.  The decline in projections 
was modest, and 40% of runs were still at or above Bref3.  A 10% catch 
reduction would be required to bring this probability up to 50%. 
                                                 
3 In considering the above statements, it is relevant to note that Bref is a reference biomass taken from 
a time when the biomass was stable under fishing conditions – this period is 1979–88. 
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Figure 2; Estimated biomass vulnerable to fishing overtime for CRA 4.  The 
vulnerable biomass is spilt into autumn–winter and summer–spring 
biomass.  Source: Kim et al 2004. 
 
The modelling work undertaken to produce this estimate indicates that the biomass of 
legal rock lobster has declined significantly since the estimated levels in the 1940s.  
However, since the fishery joined the QMS it is clear that there has been an 
improvement in the stock status to the point where it is assessed as being sustainable, 
noting that the advice also foreshadows the need for a reduction in the TACC of 
around 10 per cent. 
 
 
For CRA 5, the assessment is: 
 
These results suggest a fishery in a very healthy current state.  Current 
catch levels are technically unsustainable in that they will, on average, 
decrease population size in projections, but the extent of the decrease 








Figure 3: Estimated biomass vulnerable to fishing overtime for CRA 5.  The 
vulnerable biomass is spilt into autumn–winter and summer–spring 
biomass.  Source: Kim et al 2004 
 
The modelling work undertaken to produce this estimate indicates that the biomass of 
legal rock lobster has declined significantly since the estimated levels in the 1940s.  
However, since the fishery joined the QMS it is clear that there has been an 
improvement in the stock status to the point where it is assessed as being sustainable.  
The CRA 5 assessment is more positive then that for CRA 4 and does not foreshadow 
the need for any adjustment to the TACC.  
 
Given the legislated objective of BMSY, it is relevant to consider the catch achieved by 
the two fisheries over time.  Figure 4 plots the catch in tonnes for both fisheries for 
the period 1945–2002.  It is clear that the introduction of a QMS constrained catch 
and, that by doing so, both fisheries have produced consistently at levels judged to be 
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Figure 4: Reported catch in the CRA 4 and 5 fisheries for the period 1945–2002.  
Source: Kim et al 2004. 
 
 
While in New Zealand, the delegation heard on many occasions that the move to the 
QMS had placed greater importance and scrutiny on stock assessment.  In the case of 
rock lobster, there is also recognition that the absence of fishery independent data, 
particularly given the reliance on CPUE data, is a weakness in the system.  
Furthermore, when catches for one sector (e.g. the commercial sector) are limited, 
there is a natural tendency to examine the catch of other sectors and how (or even if) 
they are being constrained.   
 
A further issue raised by fisheries managers, scientists and industry representatives 
was the trend towards the employment of quota catchers by quota owners.  In 
particular, it has been observed that quota catchers (who do not have a stake in the 
fishery beyond their employment) do not display the same stewardship qualities that 
are present in owner/operators.  One of the consequences of this lack of stewardship 
among those who catch the fish is an unwillingness to participate in fundamental 




It is difficult to assess the New Zealand Rock Lobster Fishery against this objective 
because no rock lobster specific economic studies or surveys have been undertaken.  
However, Newell et al (2002) has examined the quota market for all fisheries in the 
New Zealand QMS.  
 
Two observations are relevant from Newell’s work.  The first is that he found 
evidence of improved profitability for fisheries managed under a QMS, and that the 
benefits were greatest for fisheries that were over-capitalised and over-exploited 
under the prior management system.  Prior to the implementation of a QMS for rock 
lobster, the fishery was considered by Newell to be over-capitalised and over-
exploited. 
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The second point of interest is the assessment of rate of return for the New Zealand 
seafood industry as a whole.  Figure 5 plots expected rate of return against both 
nominal and real New Zealand interest rates.  This figure shows that the rate of return 
in the New Zealand quota market (not just rock lobster) is consistently higher than 
official interest rates.  The inference to draw from this analysis is that the presence of 
a functional market for quota entitlement enables the industry to reach a structure that 




Figure 5: Rate of return for New Zealand quota units (not just lobster) and 
market interest rates.  Note rates of return are medians across fish 
stocks in each year.  The interest rate is based on New Zealand 
Treasury bills; the real rate is deflated using the New Zealand 
consumer price index.  Source: Newel et al 2002.   
 
Cost of Management and Compliance 
 
The cost recovery system in New Zealand, as administered by the Ministry of 
Fisheries, is not a budget-based system.  Rather, the amount contributed each year by 
industry is a fixed percentage of the deemed value of all rock lobster quotas.  
Therefore, the amount contributed is not related to the actual cost of management but 
rather the value of entitlement. 
 
In recent years, the rock lobster industry has made annual contributions in the order of 
NZ$3.3–3.5 million.  This money covers the cost of management (22 per cent), 
research (14 per cent) and compliance (64 per cent).  
 
Licensees in the rock lobster fisheries also pay an additional levy to fund industry 
support, representation and management structures such as SeaFIC (the peak seafood 
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body), the NZRLIC (the peak rock lobster industry sector body), and regional rock 
lobster organisations known as CRAMACs.      
 
Compliance is the largest single component of the management cost, and the focus of 
the compliance activities undertaken by the Ministry of Fisheries is quota-reporting 
accountability.  According to the Ministry of Fisheries, approximately one third of all 
compliance spending is dedicated to forensic accounting examination of the 
movement and reported movement of lobsters.   
 
Invariably, the majority of offences successfully prosecuted are quota offences, as 
opposed to offences relating to the take of protected lobsters or the unlicensed take of 
lobsters. 
 
Currently, there is no vessel monitoring system in the fishery. However, the potential 
benefits were mentioned in the course of conversations with both government and 
industry spokespersons.  There is a requirement to land catch at an approved landing 
site.  
 
In New Zealand, the government estimates the volume of lobster taken illegally (i.e. 
outside of the QMS), and this is considered within the TAC setting and allocation 
process.  The Government’s estimates of illegal take vary for the different fisheries 
but are particularly high – as high as 30 per cent of the TAC in some instances.  This 
is a significant proportion and points to failings within the existing compliance 
program. 
 
The NZRLIC believes that the industry’s compliance with the QMS is at acceptable 
levels, and that the Ministry of Fisheries’ compliance program on quota reporting 
accountability is appropriate.  Accepting this assertion, it is the activities of 
unlicensed fishers (fish thieves) that are not being adequately policed.   
Industry Dynamics and Fishing Patterns 
Industry size 
 
The need or desire for the fleet to restructure in New Zealand, while not explicitly 
stated in the objectives for moving into the QMS, was certainly recognised as being 
important.  Consequently, the management arrangements put in place to complement 
the setting of a TACC made relatively liberal provisions for quota entitlement to be 
transferred.   
 
It is also relevant to note that prior to the fishery’s movement into the QMS, licences 
were not divisible and therefore the ability to trade in parts of licences (units of 
entitlement) did not formally exist.  Furthermore, under the QMS, there have never 
been constraints on pot numbers or linkage between pots or quota. 
 
It is therefore not surprising that – with more liberal arrangements and direct 
constraints on catch – in the nine-year period following the introduction of the QMS 
(1990–1999), the number of quota owners decreased 31 per cent.  NZRLIC believes 
that the TACC reduction has been the primary force in driving the fleet’s restructure – 
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a view supported by the fact that in the same nine-year period the TACC has 
















































Figure 6: Total number of boats within the New Zealand Rock Lobster Fishery  
1984-1999 
 
By some standards, this level of fleet adjustment is relatively moderate and the 
division of the fishery into 10 separate fisheries and the presence of an aggregation 
limit of 10 per cent of the quota for each quota management area are factors that may 
have slowed the rate at which fleet restructuring has occurred.   
 
The concentration of ownership is a further measure of how the industry has 
restructured in New Zealand.  Connor (2001) examined the concentration of quota 
entitlement across all of New Zealand’s QMS fisheries and the contrast is an 
interesting one.  Connor used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure 
concentration of ownership4.  The HHI is expressed as a percentage, and the higher 
the percentage the greater is the concentration of ownership and market power of 
those who own the quota. 
 
For the period 1990–98, the rock lobster fishery averaged a HHI of 1.02 per cent (the 
lowest of all New Zealand fisheries).  For the same period, the mid-depth fisheries 
(including hoki, barracouta, hake and ling) averaged a HHI of 15.7 per cent.  This 
result shows that the degree to which ownership of rock lobster rights has 
concentrated is relatively low in comparison with other New Zealand fisheries in 
QMS. 
 
The hoki fishery, for example, has an annual TACC of approximately 50,000 t, and 
there is a very high cost of capital for fishing and processing. Therefore, the need for 
                                                 
4 The HHI measures concentration of ownership and market power by considering the number of 
owners and the spread of share holdings of the owners. 
 16
Fisheries Management Paper No.212 
participants in the fishery to achieve economies of scale is a significant economic 
driver.In the case of the rock lobster fishery, it is by comparison a small-volume, 
high-value fishery with low cost of capital and no specialist processing needs.   
 
Noting that there are no aggregation limits in any of the mid-depth fisheries, this 
signals the probability that the economic forces to aggregate, and vertically integrate 
is strongest in large volume fisheries, such as hoki.   
 
This New Zealand example is interesting because it indicates that the economic forces 
that drive rationalisation cannot be solely attributed to the management systems. 
Rather, it is factors such as the size of the TACC, the nature of the fishery itself and 
the presence of a market system that will determine the extent to which a fleet will 
restructure.    
 
Recognising that there has been a level of downsizing in the New Zealand rock 
lobster fishery, it is relevant to consider the effect this has had on communities that 
host the rock lobster fishery.  As previously mentioned, there are no specific 
sociological studies but the delegation was informed that many of New Zealand’s 
inshore fishermen are diversified, to varying extents, in different fisheries or fishing 
related businesses, e.g. charter.  Therefore, the towns and regions in which they live 
are diverse – even when fishing is the biggest employer.  As a consequence, it is 
likely that the resilience of these towns is such that modest reductions in the number 
of people of fish for rock lobster is unlikely to have had a significant effect.   
Value of entitlement 
 
Prior to the rock lobster fishery moving to the QMS, the management arrangements 
did not make the commercial fishing right divisible – i.e. there were no units of 
entitlement.  Consequently, there was no market and a comparison prior to QMS and 
post-QMS is not possible.  However, since the introduction of the QMS, there has 
been a significant increase in the value of the quota entitlement and the price for 
leasing quota. 
 
Newell 2002 cited prices of NZ$100,000 per tonne and an average lease price of 
NZ$10,000. 
 
One of the generic criticisms that has been levelled at QMS is the barrier to entry 
created as a consequence of the increased value of entitlement.  Newell et al 2002 
found that since 1990 there has been a net reduction in the number holding a quota in 
all new Zealand fisheries, but each year since 1990 there have been 90 new quota 
holders entering the system. 
 
This indicates that the cost of entry is not over-inflated when profitability and rate of 
return are considered.  It is relevant to not that these new entrants are mostly not 
active fishers but rather investors who lease the entitlement they own. 
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Under the QMS, some of the fisheries (CRA 1, 2 3, 4, and 5) have experienced 
significant improvements in CPUE, while the remaining fisheries have essentially 
maintained pre-QMS CPUE (CRA 6, 7 and 8) noting that these values were already 
significantly high.  Figure 7 describes the CPUE in kg/pot lift for the CRA 1–8 
fisheries for the period 1984–2001. 
 
In addition to being one indicator of resource health, a sustained improvement in 
CPUE has a positive effect on the profitability of fishers.  As lobsters become easier 
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Figure 7: CPUE (kg/pot lift) for CRA 1–8, 1984–2002. 
 
When to fish? 
 
Immediately following the move into the QMS, there was a distinct shift of effort out 
of the spring-summer period into the autumn-winter period.  This shift coincided with 
the development of the high-value Chinese live market and it is likely that a shift on a 
smaller scale would have occurred irrespective of the QMS.  However, the fact that 
the New Zealand QMS was in place and that there are no closed seasons within this 
management system enabled the industry to take full advantage of the high prices 
offered during autumn–winter.  The risk of not catch their individual allocation that 
fishers would associate with winter fishing is also lessened by the fact that the season 
begins in April.  This ensures that licensees have the entire summer period as a 
“backstop” should winter fishing not produce good catches.  Figures 8a and 8b 
illustrate the shift in seasonal fishing patterns for the CRA 4 and 5 fisheries. 
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Figure 8a: CRA 4 Catch (tonnes) represented as a summer–spring and autumn-




Figure 8b CRA 5 Catch (tonnes) represented as a summer–spring and autumn-
winter catch for the period 1945-2002. 
 
Where to fish? 
 
The division of the New Zealand fishery into 10 separate management areas limits the 
ability for operators to be highly mobile and roam large areas.   High mobility allows 
fishers to focus their efforts on areas that yield high catch rates at a given time or 
produce a class of lobster most sought after by the market.   
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That said, a number of industry representatives stated that the mobility of operators 
within the management areas has increased and that this trend is a further extension of 
market fishing.  Specifically, it was reported to the delegation that certain parts of the 
fishery are known to produce a class of lobster at a time when the market is prepared 
to pay the highest price. 
 
This increased mobility has created a new form of competition on the water in which 
fishers attempt to dominate the best grounds during peak market periods.  The tactic 
used is to overload an area with pots that aren’t necessarily baited or even actively 
fished, but simply occupy space that might otherwise be accessed by another licensee.  
Operators are able to do this because there are no restrictions on the number of pots 
that can be used.   
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Tasmania 
 
After nearly 10 years of debate, a quota management system utilising individually 
transferable quotas was introduced in the Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishery in March 
1998.  Prior to that, the fishery was managed as many rock lobster fisheries have been 
managed – a reliance on input controls including limited entry, restriction on pot 
numbers and an array of biological controls (i.e. size, and breeding condition). 
 
Under this input management system, there were increasing concerns for the status of 
the stock from both industry and government.  These concerns had emanated from a 
trend familiar to many fisheries – a doubling of fishing efforts in a 10-year period 
while the catch remained essentially the same (Ford 2000). 
 
Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that the debate as to how best to manage the 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery was principally focused on the long-term 
sustainability of the resource.  In this debate, the Tasmanians considered a number of 
management options.  However, the choice essentially came down to two options: 
ITQ, or the introduction of large (30 per cent) effort reductions  (Ford 2000).   
 
Ultimately, the decision to move to the quota system was taken because the 
government, and majority of industry, considered that an ITQ system would provide 
the greatest assurance of long-term sustainability.  Furthermore, it was acknowledged 
that there would necessarily be a reduction in fleet size under the new management 
system, and that QMS provided the best system through which fleet adjustments 








Figure 9: Northern Tasmanian fish processor with a southern rock lobster 
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Access 
 
• Operators require a rock lobster licence with not less than five and no more 
than 100 quota units. 
• Quota units are allocated in perpetuity under the Living Marine Resources 
Management Act 1995, with an expectation of annual renewal.  
• Each quota unit entitles the holder to take 1/10,507 of a given TACC and to 
use 1 pot per unit (up to a maximum of 50 pots per boat). 
• Units are freely tradeable and there are no owner/operator provisions. 
• There is a maximum of 10,507 pots in the fishery. 
• Each licensee can access the entire fishery (i.e. there is only one zone). 
• Licences and quota units are freely transferable, noting that quota units must 
be attached to a licence.  
• There are no foreign ownership restrictions.  
• There are two types of processing authorisations: handling (up to five animals 
at a time, cheap and unlimited), and processing (more than five animals, 
relatively more expensive, unlimited). 
Sustainability 
 
• There is a total allowable catch (TAC) for the entire fishery (no zones). 
• The Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) is 1,523 tonnes. 
• The Minister for Fisheries can adjust the TACC for a given quota management 
area to meet sustainability objectives.   
• Detailed catch disposal records are required.  
• There is a minimum legal length for both male and female animals: 110mm 
for males and 105mm for females (both measurements are carapace length). 
• Berried females cannot be taken. 
• Trap design requirements are: 
o Maximum trap size (1200mm x 1200m x 750mm); 
o Single entrance at least 200mm in diameter;  
o One escape gap (57mm x 400mm), or two escape gaps (57mm x 
200mm). 
• Live lobster can be held on the vessel, in corfs, or on land. 
• A number of small closed areas exist (e.g. Taroona waters). 
• There are no quota carry-over provisions. 
Season 
 
• There is a two-month closure mid-September–mid-November to protect 
spawning females and moulting males. 
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Figure 10:  Jurisdiction of Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishery and usual fishing 
grounds. Source: Williamson 2002. 
 
Fisheries Management 
Performance against objectives of the new system 
 
The quota management system for the Tasmanian Fishery was introduced to: 
 
1. Reduce the catch to a sustainable level by rebuilding the biomass of the rock 
lobster resource over time; and 
2. Provide a mechanism to allow the industry to restructure. 
 
These objectives arose because the government and the majority of industry had 
agreed that there was an over-capacity problem in the fishery that was leading to the 
over-exploitation of the resource and limiting the economic viability of the industry as 
a whole. 
 
In Tasmania, the management system relies principally on the advice of the 
Tasmanian Aquaculture and Fisheries Institute (TAFI) as to the health or 
sustainability of the resource.  In reporting on the sustainability of the rock lobsters, 
TAFI uses eight performance indicators.  The eight performance indicators used are: 
(i) commercial catch rates; (ii) research catch rates; (iii) estimated legal-sized 
biomass; (iv) egg production; (v) abundance of undersize lobsters; (vi) total catch; 
(vii) size of the fleet; and (viii) recreational catch. 
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To illustrate the effect on the sustainability of the resource in Tasmania attributed to 
the QMS, Figure 11 shows the legal size biomass, pot lift numbers (effort), and catch 





Fig. 11: Rock lobster catch/effort and biomass estimates – estimated effort (pot 
lifts), estimated catch rate (kg/pot lift), and estimated legal sized 
biomass (tonnes), 1947 –2002. Source: Witt 2004. 
 
Figure 11 shows that, since the introduction of the QMS, there has been a significant 
increase in the biomass of legal sized lobsters, a reduction in the total number of pot 
lifts, and an overall improvement in the CPUE.   
 
For the season ending 2003, TAFI reported that the trends were generally positive, 
with no trigger points activated.  It was noted that there are aspects of the assessment 
that warrant further discussion and investigation (Gardner 2004).   
 
The move to a QMS has, in the opinion of a senior Tasmanian research scientist, put 
an increased focus on the stock assessment process and highlighted the importance of 
having good fishery-independent methods for estimating the fishery’s health.  An 
over-reliance on CPUE data is risky under a QMS because the factors that influence 
CPUE, and therefore how CPUE can be interpreted, are different under input versus 
output systems.   
 
By setting a TACC that constrained catch below historic levels and having a relatively 
free system under which quota could be transferred among fishers, restructuring of the 
industry began immediately.  Figure 12 shows that prior to the introduction of the 
QMS, reductions in the fleet size had already commenced. However, the rate at which 
this restructure occurred, both in terms of licence and vessel numbers, increased with 
the introduction of the QMS.  This reduction corresponds with the effective constraint 
of catch under the new management system. 
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Fig. 12: Number of vessels and entitlement owners for seasons 1983/84 to 
2001/02. Source: Frusher et al, 2003. 
Cost of management and Compliance Issues 
 
The Tasmanian Government does not fully recover the cost of managing the 
commercial rock lobster fishery.  Currently, licensees pay $211 per quota unit – a 
level similar to what it has been since 2001.  Fisheries managers estimate that this 
represents approximately 80 per cent of the full cost of management and varies from 
3.6–5 per cent of the fishery’s gross value of production.  The licence fees collected 
are paid directly into the State’s consolidated revenue.   
 
The method for allocating costs does not allow for a detailed evaluation of what 
additional costs (or savings) have occurred as a result of moving to a QMS.  However, 
a government representative estimated that there was an additional compliance cost of 
$300,000 associated with moving to a QMS.   
 
In Tasmania, departmental officers and the State police manage compliance jointly.  It 
is the departmental staff who undertake the forensic investigations associated with the 
QMS.  This team is made up of five officers, including accountants.  The police 
conduct enforcement/patrolling type activities and maintain a significant “at sea” 
presence of approximately 180 seas days per year.  This balance of quota 
accountability and on-ground compliance activities is regarded as important in 
underpinning the legitimacy of the QMS.    
 
As a consequence both industry and government consider the rate of non-compliance 
to be low.   
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Under the QMS, it was reported by both industry and fisheries managers that there is 
an increased absentee ownership and therefore less custodianship of the resource.  
This in itself has caused a compliance issue, and the response of more compliance 
further exacerbates the problem because it increases management costs which are 
inevitably passed onto the fisher, who then has reduced margins and further incentives 
to cheat. 
Industry Dynamics and Fishing Patterns 
Industry size 
It is clear from Figure 12 that the Tasmanian QMS facilitated an accelerated 
restructure of the industry – something that was intended.  The removal of 70 boats 
(approximately 22 per cent of the fleet) in a two-year period represents a significant 
adjustment, however, the majority of those who are in the fishery were invariably 




Figure 13: Typical Tasmanian rock lobster fishing vessels in port. 
 
With an effective cap on catch and a relatively free transferability system, the rapid 
fleet adjustment occurred because owners of multiple licences who had previously 
leased a portion of their entitlement consolidated their holdings into viable units.  
Furthermore owner/operators, who were typically high catchers under the input 
management system and had decided to stay in the fishery, re-invested in the first two 
years to ensure the same level of catch they achieved under the input system.   
 
As a result, a new class of larger licences emerged that prior to the QMS hadn’t been 
seen in the fishery.  Figure 14 shows the emergence of licences with more than 40 
units post-QMS. 
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This form of adjustment meant that those who exited the fishery in the first years of 
the QMS were typically fishers who leased the majority of the entitlement that they 




Fig. 14: Comparison of the ownership of the access rights prior to the QMS, and 
two years later.  Source: Ford 2000a. 
 
In addition to the on-water changes, there have also changes in the onshore processing 
infrastructure.  Shortly after the QMS was introduced, a number of factories closed 
down in some of the more remote locations (e.g. Strahan). The reduction in 
processing facilities is most likely a direct response to initial and real reduction in the 
total catch.  It is also possible that the contraction in boat numbers meant that rock 
lobster processing facilities in some ports are simply not required.   
 
Studies into the effects of the QMS on hosting communities (Frusher et al. 2003; 
Williamson 2002) did not attribute either positive or negative effects on Tasmanian 
hosting communities to the QMS.  The fact that there are no rock lobster specific 
towns or regional centres in Tasmania is likely to be significant.  
Value of entitlement 
Prior to the introduction of the QMS, there was a relatively modest growth in the 
value of a Tasmanian rock lobster entitlement.  Once the QMS was introduced, the 
value of entitlement in the fishery rapidly increased as the market for access was 
limited by supply.   
 
Specifically, in 1994 a pot entitlement was valued at $4,000 and this had grown to 
$10,000 in 1997 (the year before the QMS).  Just 18 months after the QMS was 
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introduced, a unit of entitlement in the fishery was trading for $20,000 and in 2003 
units were as high as $50,000 in the marketplace.  A similar pattern was followed in 
the lease market, as operators who couldn’t afford to buy quota sought to lease it in 
order to maintain catch at levels they were used to. 
 
As a consequence of this growth in the value of entitlement and the strength of 
demand in the lease market, it has become increasingly difficult for new entrants to 
buy into the fishery and expensive for existing participants to continually re-invest.  In 
this market, investors have begun to have a greater presence – periodically purchasing 
small quantities of quota units to lease back to the catching sector.  The leasing of 
investors’ quota back to industry is often facilitated by established processors who act 
as middlemen to secure supply without the high capital cost of buying quota 
themselves.   
 
To illustrate how the cost of access in the fishery has risen, Frusher et al (2003) use 
the following example.   
 
In 1990, pot entitlement was valued at $4,000 and the beach price was $10/kg.  In  
2002, a quota unit is valued at $50,000 and the beach price $35/kg.  In 1990, a fisher 
could pay off an investment in a couple of years. However, in 2002, it would take 
more than 10 years to repay the debt.   
 
Industry members made the observation that moving from an input system to a QMS 
shifted the investment away from what was the key element in successful fishing – the 
boat (and crew) – to the unit itself.  Lease fishermen, whose stake in the industry was 
limited to owning a boat, found that they owned the wrong capital.  This was 
compounded by the fact that other Tasmanian fisheries also had excess capacity 
issues.  Consequently, the market for hulls being retired from the fishery has not been  
strong.    
 
There is a social cost of the form of adjustment in Tasmania.  This cost has been 
borne by lease fishers who have been forced to exit the fishery and have not found it 
easy to other ready forms of employment. 




With a reduced number of boats and gradual improvement in the status of the rock 
lobster resource, those who remained in the fishery quickly began to enjoy improved 
catch rates (see Figure 15) and a reduction in the overall cost of fishing as fishers 
went to sea fewer days in order to catch their allocation.  A number of fishers said that 
moving to the QMS effectively turned off the rush to fish and, in addition to making 
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Fig. 15: Comparison of rock lobster catch rates prior to the QMS and two years 
after.  Source: Ford 2000a. 
  
When to Fish? 
 
In addition to finding fishing easier, there is also evidence emerging that the pattern of 
fishing – in terms of when and where fishing occurs – has emerged.  However, it 
would be false to say that it is entirely the QMS that has led to this change.  
 
Historically, catch rates in Tasmania are highest in the summer months (November–
March) and lower in the winter months (April–September).  However, since 1993-94, 
the TAFI data sets show that the number of operators choosing to fish the winter 
months has been steadily increasing.  The pre-quota trend towards winter fishing was 
primarily motivated by the development of the Chinese live market.  The 
development of this new market saw the prices for lobster caught in the winter months 
greatly exceed that caught in the summer period (by as much as two times). 
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Figure 16: A comparison of the proportion of the rock lobster fleet fishing in 
summer and winter for the period 1990–2001.  Source: Frusher et al 
2003. 
 
It is also likely that increased winter fishing occurred in response to a number of 
effort control measures introduced from 1992 to 1994, i.e. the re-mobilisation of 
effort into time periods where it was not constrained5. 
 
Since the introduction of the QMS, these trends have continued, albeit not at the 
spectacular rate of change observed for fleet restructuring.  Both catch and processing 
sectors of the Tasmanian industry state that under the QMS, decisions about when to 
fish are increasingly based on price.  In fact, under the QMS, processors are sending 
direct signals to fishers (through the beach price) when the optimum fishing times are 
from a market perspective.   
 
The apparent success of the QMS from a sustainability perspective is further 
underpinning the economics of winter fishing as the winter catch rates in many areas 
of the Tasmanian fishery have increased significantly (Gardner 2004). 
 
It is also relevant to note that when the QMS was established, the start date for the 
season was changed from November to March.  This season strategy has given the 
industry the confidence to fish during the typically lower catch rate winter months 
because they know they can catch whatever quota allocation they have left over 
during the high-catch rate summer months. 
Where to fish? 
 
Processors are not only sending signals to industry about when to fish but also with 
respect to what type of lobster they want, and this is influencing where the fleet is 
fishing.  The high-paying Chinese live market prefers a large red lobster and these are 
found in greatest abundance in shallow water off the coast.  Accordingly, there is a 
                                                 
5 Effort control measures including seasonal closure and a ban on night fishing were introduced in 
1992, 1993 and 1994. 
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trend towards increased shallow water fishing (Figure 17).  Comments from industry 
suggest that the trend towards fishing more in shallower waters is also being 
promoted by fishers making decisions to reduce, or at least seek to control, the cost of 






Figure 17: Example of the shift to an increased percentage of catch and effort 
taken from shallow water grounds (less then 50m).  Area 6 is located 
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South Australia 
The South Australian Rock Lobster Fishery is in fact two fisheries – the northern zone 
fishery and the southern zone fishery.  These fisheries target the same species of 
lobster (Jasus edwardsii) and, until very recently, were managed under separate and 
contrasting systems.   
 
The southern zone fishery extends from the mouth of the Murray River, south and 
east to the Victorian border.  It is typified by an abundance of high-density fishable 
bottom that stretches from the high-water mark to the continental shelf, which is 
relatively close to shore.  These two factors mean that extended travel in the southern 
zone is not necessary.   
 
This fishery has been managed under a QMS with input controls since 1993.  This 
system of management was implemented primarily to ensure resource sustainability – 
fleet adjustment was not an explicit concern or objective of the new arrangements.   
 
In contrast, the northern zone is a much larger area, covering some 3,700 km of 
coastline.  It extends west to the Western Australian border from the Murray River 
mouth.  This zone is characterised by patchy habitat interspersed between large tracts 
of flat sandy bottom, and operators are forced to cover large areas to find adequate 
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The northern zone resisted the change to a QMS until 2003, staying with an input-
based system of management.  The reasons for staying with input controls included: 
the high northern zone inter-annual variations in recruitment and the perception that 
this would make TAC setting difficult; the likely high cost of compliance; uncertainty 
about allocation; and general support for the pre-existing input system (Edwards and 
Presser 1993). 
 
The “change of heart” in the northern zone came about because the fishery had 
effectively exhausted the various input control measures available to promote 
sustainability and these efforts had all largely failed.  In particular, nine different 
effort control packages that included both time closures and pot reductions between 
1992 and 2002 had failed to correct the signs of stock decline.   
 
In 2001, a review process to tackle sustainability concerns in the northern zone 
commenced. At the same time, the southern zone was reaping the benefits from its 
successful management shift some 10 years earlier.  The gulf between the two 
fisheries is illustrated by the fact that in 2002: 
 
• The southern zone caught its TACC with the lowest number of pot lifts ever 
recorded, while catch rates and biomass were at the highest levels for 30 years.   
• The northern zone catch (uncapped under input controls) was the lowest since 
1979, while catch rates and biomass were at the lowest levels since 1970.  
(Ward 2004)  
 
Against this backdrop, the northern zone review process resulted in the SA 
Government and the majority of industry taking the decision to implement a QMS 
with the maintenance of some input controls – albeit different from those in place in 
the southern zone.   
Fishery Facts - Southern Zone  
Species  
 
• Southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) 
Access 
 
• A rock lobster licence is required, with a licence containing both pot units and 
quota units with the following limitations: 
o 40 < pot units < 100  (but may only use a maximum of 80); 
o 40 < quota units < 100. 
• The TAC system is based on the total number of pots in the fishery (11,923) 
and each pot unit entitles the holder to take 1/11,923 of a given TACC and to 
use 1 pot per unit (up to a maximum of 100 pots per boat). 
• Licences and units are allocated under the Fisheries Act 1982 with an 
expectation of renewal annually. 
• There is a maximum of 11,923 pots in the fishery. 
• There is a maximum number of licences (187). 
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• Each licensee can access the entire southern zone fishery (i.e. there is only one 
zone). 
• Licences and pot units are transferable (but pot units must be attached to a 
licence).  
• There is a 15per cent foreign ownership limit. 
• Only individuals can own licences. 
Sustainability 
 
• There is a total allowable catch (TAC) for the entire southern zone fishery (no 
zones). 
• The Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) in 2004 was 1,900 tonnes. 
• The Minister for Fisheries can adjust the TACC for a given quota management 
area to meet sustainability objectives.   
• Detailed catch disposal records are required.  
• There is a minimum legal length for both male and female animals: 98.5mm 
(measurement is carapace length). 
• Berried females cannot be taken. 
• Trap design requirements are:   
o dimensions (diameter 1m, height 1m, weight 40kg, 50mm mesh); 
o escape gaps (50 mm mesh or 55 x 150 escape gap); 
o single top entrance. 
• Live lobster can be held on the vessel, in corfs or on land. 
• A number of small closed areas exist (e.g. Margaret Brock Reef). 
Season 
 
• 1 October-30 April 
Fishery Facts – Northern Zone 
Species  
• Southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) 
Access 
 
• A rock lobster licence is required, and the licence contains both pot units and 
quota units with the following limitations: 
o 25< pot units < 70  
o 400 > quota units  
• Unlike the Southern Zone, there is not an explicit link between pots and quota. 
In fact, the two are quite separate and there is no upper limit on the quantity of 
quota held by a single operator.  
• There is a maximum of 3,950 pots in the fishery. 
• Each licensee can access the entire northern zone fishery (i.e. there is only one 
zone). 
• Licences, pot units and quota units are freely transferable (each in their own 
right) noting that pot and quota units must be attached to a licence.  
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• There is a 15per cent foreign ownership limit. 
Sustainability 
 
• There is a total allowable catch (TAC) for the entire northern zone fishery (no 
zones). 
• The Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) in 2004 was 625 tonnes. 
• The Minister for Fisheries can adjust the TACC for a given quota management 
area to meet sustainability objectives.   
• Detailed catch disposal records are required.  
• There is a minimum legal length for both male and female animals: 105mm 
(measurement is carapace length). 
• Berried females cannot be taken. 
• Trap design requirements are:  
o dimensions (diameter 1m, height 1m, weight 40kg, 50mm mesh); 
o escape gaps (50 mm mesh or 55 x 150 escape gap); 
o single top entrance. 
• Live lobster can be held on the vessel, in corfs or on land. 
• Pots can only be pulled once per day. 
• One closed area exists (Gleason landing). 
Season 
 
• The closed season is 1 June-31 October. 
Fisheries Management  
Performance against objectives of the new system  
 
For both the southern and northern zone fisheries, the paramount objective in moving 
to a QMS was resource sustainability.  Interestingly, with the southern zone, industry 
restructure was not an explicit objective. In fact, it is truer to say that there was an 
objective not to restructure the industry.  With the northern zone, restructure was not 





In South Australia, the South Australian Research and Development Institute 
(SARDI) provides advice on the health of fisheries resources to stakeholders and the 
responsible management agency – Primary Industries and Resources South Australia 
(PIRSA).  For both the northern and southern zones, important sustainability 
performance indicators include: (i) catch rate; (ii) mean weight; (iii) abundance of 
pre-recruits; (iv) exploitation rate; and (v) egg production.   
 
In its May 2004 stock assessment report on the southern zone, SARDI advised that: 
 
“Assessment of all of the information available for the fishery suggests 
that the biomass rebuilding strategy for the SZRLF has succeeded and that 
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the resource which the fishery is based is currently in a very strong 
position.” 
 
Figures 19a and 19b illustrate, for some of the performance indicators, the 
improvement in the health of the southern zone fishery since the introduction of the 
QMS in 1993.   
 
 





Figure 19b: Exploitation rate of legal rock lobsters 1970 2002.  Source: Ward et 
al 2004. 
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On the face of it, the success of the southern zone QMS is a little puzzling given that 
the TACC is not significantly different to the reported catch under the pre-existing 
input management system.  However, this misrepresents the true situation.   
 
Both government and the industry acknowledge that prior to the QMS, a significant 
proportion of the catch was not reported.  Ward et al (2001) estimated that the mean 
annual reported catch of 1,518 tonnes for the period prior to the introduction of the 
QMS should in fact be adjusted to 2,000 tonnes.  Therefore, the initial TACC of 1,720 
tonnes actually constrained the catch.  The rapid recovery was also aided by the 
environmental characteristics of the southern zone that provide for regular recruitment 
on high-density lobster habitat.  
 
A number of industry members also commented that the mix of input and output 
controls has wider ecological benefits.  In particular, it was said that limiting the 
maximum number of pots per licence and for the fishery as a whole capped the 
incidence of marine mammal capture (whales, seals and sea lions), as was the risk of 
physical damage to the benthos.   
 
At present, the assessment of resource health in the northern zone is not so positive.  
In its May 2004 stock assessment report on the southern zone (just one year after the 
introduction of the QMS system), SARDI advised that: 
 
“Collectively, the results of this study show that the biomass in NZRLF is 
at its lowest level in the history of the fishery and that the TACC for 
2003/04 should be set at a level that will facilitate biomass rebuilding and 
ensure that performance indicators return quickly to the reference levels 
outlined in the Management Plan. 
 
“Forecasts of future biomass under a range of quota level, based on the 
outputs of the qR and integrated stock assessment models, suggest that the 
exploitable lobster biomass in the NZRLF will increase in 2005 and/or 
2006 under all quota levels examined, but that biomass rebuilding may not 
be sustained beyond 2006 for quotas above 500 t and that a quota below 
500 tonnes may be required to ensure this outcome.” 
 
Figures 20 a and 20b illustrate, for some of the performance indicators, the decline in 
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Figure 20b: Exploitation rate of legal rock lobsters 1970–2002.  Source: Ward et 
al 2004. 
 
The poor state of the northern stock has not resulted from a lack of action under the 
pre-existing input management system.  Table 1 summarises input management action 
taken to address sustainability from 1966 to 2003.  Ward et al (2001) attributed the 
failure of management action taken under the input management system to an over 
reliance on fishery dependent data – in particular, the use of catch per unit effort was 
the primary indicator of resource health.   
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Northern zone fishers and fisheries managers further explained that while changes in 
nominal effort (number of pot lifts) did not change significantly, effective effort had 
increased substantially.  The industry was able to maintain catch rates (kg pot lift) by 
adopting and utilising new technologies such as global positioning systems and faster 
vessels despite the declining biomass.  So effective were the fishers at maintaining 
catch rates, that an independent scientific review in 2002 did not find that the fishery 
was unsustainable. 
 
Table 1. History of management initiatives for the Northern Zone Fishery 
 
Year Management Measure 
1966 Winter closure 
1968 Limited entry declared, northern zone declared 
1985 10per cent pot reduction, upper pot limit increased from 60 to 65 
1992 10per cent pot reduction, upper pot limit reduced from 65 to 60 pots, 
industry management review undertaken 
1993 One week additional fixed time closure 
1994 Legal minimum length increased from 98.5 to 102mm, additional one 
week fixed time closure 
1995 Additional one week fixed time closure 
1997 Flexible closure options introduced 
1999 Additional three days of fixed time closure 
2000 Legal minimum length increased from 102 to 105mm 
2001 Two week fixed time closure 
2002 Two week additional time closure, greater flexibility in time closure 
system introduced, major management review undertaken, upper pot limit 
increased from 60 to 70 pots 






The different economic objectives for the two zones are reflected in the different use 
of input controls to complement the QMS for the two fisheries.  For example, in the 
southern zone, maximum holding restrictions and limits on the transferability of 
entitlement are designed to limit aggregation and investment from outside of the 
fishery.  While in the northern zone, there is no maximum holding limit nor are there 
such stringent restrictions on transferability.  Consequently, the behaviour of fishers 
in the market has differed markedly.   
 
Recognising that at the time the delegation visited South Australia the QMS was only 
in its second full season in the northern zone, it is difficult to do more then make a 
few simple observations that relate to economic performance.  An article in the Port 
Lincoln Times (September 2005) reports that in the past four years, 27 boats (35 per 
cent of the fleet) have left the fishery and that there are many licences advertised for 
sale.  Furthermore, approximately 20 of the remaining 50 fishers have made the 
decision to trade in large fast vessels for more fuel efficient and slower vessels.   
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Economic performance was not an explicit objective for the introduction of a QMS in 
the southern zone, however, some relevant observations on the southern zone are 
made under the Industry Dynamics and Fishing Patterns section.   
Cost of management and compliance issues 
 
All South Australian commercial fisheries operate under full cost recovery and the 
cost of management is recovered through annual licence fees.  Table 2 provides a 
summary of the cost of managing the northern and southern fishery for the period 
1996-97 to 2002-03. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of fisheries management costs  
 
Southern Zone (QMS with input 
controls) 
Northern Zone (Input controls only) 
Fees as a percentage of GVP decreased 
from 4.7per cent to 3.4per cent 
 
Fees as a percentage of GVP increased 
from 3.6per cent to 4.3per cent 
Fees per kg of landed lobster decreased 
from $1.35 to $1.22. 
 
Fees per kg of landed lobster decreased 
from $0.97 to $1.35. 
 
Cost per licensee increased from $11,890 
to $11,975. 
 
Cost per licensee increased from $11,278 
to $11,666. 
 
Table 2 shows the southern zone in a period of relative management stabilisation and 
the northern zone in a period of relative less management stability and ultimately 
transition.  The cost of management closely reflects comments made by PIRSA 
fisheries managers.  In particular, fisheries managers commented that the biggest cost 
associated with a QMS is making the transition, and that compliance then potentially 
becomes the biggest issue and the biggest ongoing cost. 
 
When the northern zone fishery moved to QMS in 2003, there was a subsequent 28 
per cent increase in the cost per licensee ($14,916).  This increase reflects the cost of 
implementing the new management system.   
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Table 3: Breakdown of fisheries management costs for the southern zone 
fishery 2003-04 financial year.  
   
Cost Area $ Percentage 
Policy and Management 
 
$243,569 9.8 per cent 
Administration 
 
$56,990 2.3 per cent 
Research (not including 
external sources) 
 
$751,298 30.4 per cent 
Compliance 
 
$1,414,619 57.4 per cent 
Total 
 
$2,466,476 100 per cent 
    
 
The under-reporting of catch prior to the implementation of QMS in South Australia 
has been broadly recognised.  When the fishery moved into the QMS it was supported 
with a vastly improved compliance program and this is thought to have substantially 
reduced the rate of non-compliance. 
 
In the South Australian context, one the issues confronting compliance officers is the 
“turn on/turn off” nature of the fishery.  The reasons why the fishery operates in this 
way are explained under Changes in Fishing Patterns, but the unpredictability of 
when fishing will occur makes it difficult to plan when compliance resources should 
be deployed.  Both industry and government identified the benefit and potential 
compliance efficiencies that could be gained with the adoption of a vessel monitoring 




Figure 20: A weigh station in the Southern Zone fishery. 
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Industry Dynamics and Fishing Patterns 
Industry size 
It has already been stated that there has been very little change in boat numbers in the 
southern zone either prior to or following the introduction of the QMS, compared to 
the significant fall in vessel numbers in the northern zone since the introduction of a 
QMS.  Figure 22 plots the number of licences in the northern and southern fishery 


































Figure 22: Change in boat numbers for the northern and southern zone 
fisheries 1989-2005  
 
The reduction in vessels in the northern zone simply represents the expected industry 
response to a management system that significantly constrained catch and provided 
transferability rules that facilitated the aggregation of entitlement and therefore the 
restructuring of the fleet.   
 
The southern zone situation is interesting because it dispels the perception that under 
a QMS the industry will contract in number as larger, more economically powerful 
participants aggregate quota entitlements.  The reasons why fleet size has remained 
relatively constant is most likely a combination of regulatory restrictions and the 
health of the fishery.   
 
Because industry restructure was not an objective, when the QMS was implemented a 
number of input measures was also introduced.  The most relevant are: 
 
• the link between pot entitlement and quota entitlement; 
• limiting the maximum number of pot and quota entitlement units that can be 
held on a licence; 
• limiting transactions in entitlement to those who already hold licences; and 
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• the enforcement of an owner/operator policy. 
 
These rules are certainly constraining economic forces that would otherwise be 
promoting the restructuring of the fishery.  However, both fisheries managers and the 
industry have stated that they are not a perfect solution.  In fact, the ownership rules 
may be causing a disparity between what structure appears on the water and what the 
true ownership is, hidden in company documents away from the eyes of fisheries 
managers. 
 
In addition to the regulatory controls, it has also been suggested that the community 
structure of the small coastal towns that host the southern zone fishery exert 
considerable social forces that resist, or at least discourage, investment in the fishery 
from “outsiders” (Morgan 1999). 
 
The strong performance of the southern zone since the introduction of QMS is clear to 
see in Figure 23.  The dramatically increased catch rate has enabled fishers to catch 
their allocated catch in a fraction of the days previously required, effectively lowering 
the overall cost of fishing for a similar or even improved revenue.  This strong 
performance made it possible for all operators to increase or at least maintain their 





Figure 23: Trends in catch and effort in South Australia’s southern zone fishery 
1970–2002.  Source: Ward 2004. 
 
 
Further evidence of the industry’s profitability following the introduction of the QMS 
is a significant investment in new vessels.  From an economic perspective, investment 
in capital as opposed to quota does not seem rational.  When asked why there had 
been an investment in boats, the industry offered the following explanations: 
 
• industry has been profitable and people want to be comfortable; and 
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• there is a practical need to pick up all deployed gear when the market 
conditions determine that fishing is not worthwhile. 
 
It is possible that the investment in boats was has been a “second choice investment”, 
i.e. because the market for quota (the first choice market) is heavily regulated and 
therefore very small, it is difficult to invest in.  As a consequence, industry invested 
its profits in a more traditional way that is typical of behaviour under an input 
management system.   
Value of entitlement 
Throughout much of the 1990s, the respective values of entitlement in the northern 
and southern zones were essentially the same despite the fact that the southern zone 
moved to a QMS in 1993, while the northern zone stayed with input controls.  In fact, 
the market placed a higher or equal value on the northern zone entitlement until 2001 
when a significant gulf between the southern and northern zones emerged.  Figure 24 
represents the change in entitlement value from 1992 to 2002.   
 
This timing coincides closely with the knowledge that the status of the southern 
fishery was very good and that the status of the northern zone was comparatively 
poor.  Therefore, in South Australia, it is likely that the health of the resource is the 














































Figure 24: Value of entitlement in the southern and northern zone fisheries 
1992- 2002. 
 
This contrasts with other fisheries, such as the Tasmanian fishery, where stock status 
is undoubtedly a factor in determining the value of entitlement. But other factors that 
define the nature of the right are equally important.  For erxample, the extent to which 
the licence is divisible (into tradeable units) and the presence or absence of 
restrictions of transferability are significant considerations in the market place. 
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The limitations within the southern zone management system appear to have 
dampened the market’s enthusiasm for rights issued in this quota managed fishery and 
in doing so may have impeded the economic development of the fishery. 
 
One of the more obvious economic costs of the southern zone QMS is the under-
utilisation of capital.  As catch rates have increased, the number of fishing days has 
decreased but aggregation limits have prevented the fleet from adjusting.  As a 




Figure 24: Shipyard in southern zone fishery of South Australia. 
 
The lack of a functioning market may be a further cost.  Trading in units is rare and 
usually only occurs when a licensee wants to retire from the fishery.  Even in such an 
event, the licence is typically sold in small parcels (approximately five units) because 
whole licence purchases are prevented either by the high cost or aggregation limits.  
The absence of a functioning marketplace, through which new entrants to the fishery 
can gain access, may result in a generational gap in expertise and labour in the 
fishery.   
 
Despite these apparent limitations, the current participants in the southern zone 
fishery are staunch defenders of the existing management system, and it is the 
sociological benefits currently being realised that are key to this defence.  In 
particular, industry members are content with the lifestyle choices provided by a 
fishery and management system that only requires them to fish for 80 days a year.  
Owner/operators have made choices to invest in other non-fishing related businesses, 
become more involved in community life and spend more time and money on 
recreation.    
 
                                                 
6 On typical southern zone vessel can take its annual allocation in 80 days. 
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These lifestyle benefits are contingent upon the fishery remaining profitable for the 
existing number of operators. 
 
If the northern zone, QMS is successful and as the stock recovers it will be interesting 
to contrast how the market differentiates the value of northern and southern 
entitlement in the future. 
Changes in fishing patterns 
 
When to fish? 
 
The southern zone season runs from 1 October to 30 April of the following year, 
while the northern zone season commences on 1 November and finishes on 31 May of 
the following year.  
Traditionally, catch rates have been highest in the summer months and accordingly 
the greater percentage of fishing has occurred at this time.  Unlike Tasmania, the 
implementation of QMS has not seen a trend to increased winter fishing in order to 
take advantage of seasonally higher prices.  The simple reason for this is that in South 
Australia both fisheries are closed during the winter months7.  
With limited pots at their disposal, fishers in the southern zone have actually further 
concentrated effort into the months of October, November, December and January.  It 
is also apparent from discussions with industry that the timing of the season, i.e. 
finishing on 30 April, does not encourage fishers to shift catch into autumn because if 
fishing is poor or there is poor weather there is a risk that they may not be able to take 
their full allocation. 
 
A small number of operators have begun to leave quota for March and April and have 
reportedly enjoyed good prices for their product, but they still regard such a strategy 
as risky. 
 
The market is influencing when fish are taken but rather than it being a seasonal 
influence, it is a daily one.  One industry member described the fishery as a “phone 
call fishery”, i.e. the operator calls the processor (or a number of processors) to 
enquire what price they are prepared to pay and decides whether or not to fish based 
on this information.   
 
Given that the northern zone system has only very recently been introduced, there is 
currently no understanding of any change in fishers’ behaviour. 
 
Where to fish? 
 
The availability of lobster habitat throughout the southern zone and close proximity of 
the continental shelf has meant southern zone fishers have, traditionally, not travelled 
long distances.  In contrast, northern zone fishers need to travel further  to make the 
most of isolated patches of habitat separated by large, barren areas.   
 
There is no evidence to suggest that introduction of QMS for the two zones has 
significantly changed these patterns.  That said, in the southern zone where the QMS 
                                                 
7 Winter fishing is prohibited to protect egg carrying females from disturbance (Lewis pers comm.) 
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has increased the abundance of lobster, and therefore catch rates, a pattern is 
emerging that suggests operators are catching an increased percentage of their 
allocation in shallow water.  There are two plausible explanations for the shift to 
shallower fishing in the southern zone: 
 
a) the market is paying a premium for larger, redder lobster, which are relatively 
more abundant in shallow water; and   
b) with increased abundance of lobster, there is no need to travel further offshore 
in order to catch your allocation. 
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Findings 
 
Quota management systems are now in place for the New Zealand, Tasmanian and 
South Australian rock lobster fisheries.  New Zealand was the first to move to QMS 
(1989), followed by the Southern Zone of South Australia (1993), Tasmania (1998) 
and Northern Zone of South Australia (2001). 
 
Throughout the world of fisheries management, there are a number of assumptions 
made about quota management systems.  Most common is that under a QMS: 
 
• it is possible to constrain catch to sustainable levels; 
• the fleet size falls, the ownership of commercial fishing access rights will 
concentrate; 
• there will be vertical integration through the catching and processing sectors; 
and  
• the new rights holders will display greater stewardship towards the resource..   
 
These assumptions are made because the economic theory is that there are strong 
incentives for fishing fleets to restructure in order to become more efficient and focus 
on maximising the value of their catch, as opposed to investing in inputs to maximise 
their catch.   
 
As part of a review of the system of management used for the West Coast Rock 
Lobster Fishery, a Western Australian delegation visited New Zealand, Tasmania and 
South Australia in 2004 to learn more about the management systems used for their 
respective rock lobster fisheries.   
 
The delegation wanted to test the quota management theories by observing and 
learning from the experience of similar fisheries that are quota managed.  In 
particular, the delegation wanted to look at the regulatory approach taken, and 
understand what effect that approach has had on the fishery and the industry with 
regards to resource sustainability, and the economic and sociological effects. 
 
The focus of this exercise was on the commercial aspect of the respective fisheries – 
not the recreational or customary components.   
 
Each of the fisheries visited targets the southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) and 
the delegation found that common to all the management systems is the use of a total 
allowable commercial catch (TACC) to constrain the industry’s annual catch.  The 
TACC is then divided into transferable quota units held on licences that are renewed 
annually.  All fisheries complement the TACC with the use of biological controls, i.e. 
size limits and protection of animals in a breeding condition.   
 
Key differences between the fisheries include the presence or absence of: zones 
within the fishery, closed seasons, limitations on pot use, pot design and restrictions 
on the transferability and ownership of units of entitlement (both pots and quota).  
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The delegation observed that the absence or presence of these measures influences the 
behaviour of the industry both with respect to investment and fishing strategy 
decisions.  Relevant literature supplied to the delegation supports many of these 
observations.   
 
This report groups its analysis of the respective management systems into two 
categories – fisheries management and industry dynamics and fishing patterns.   
 
Fisheries management 
For each of the fisheries observed, the decision to move to a QMS was primarily 
based on the need to address sustainability concerns.  In all cases, the inability to 
successfully manage under the pre-existing input-based systems meant the decision to 
adopt a QMS was ultimately supported by the government and the majority of 
industry. 
 
Subsequent to implementing a QMS, each of the fisheries experienced significant 
improvements in key sustainability indicators.  The notable exception is the Northern 
Zone South Australian Fishery where the QMS was just in its second season of 
operation.   
 
The improved situation is in New Zealand, Tasmania and the Southern Zone of South 
Australia is due largely to the setting of a TACC that actually constrained or reduced 
catch.  This allowed the stock to rebuild, and in some cases, rebuild quite rapidly.   
 
One consequence of moving to QMS and therefore the need to set a TACC is the 
increased scrutiny that the stock assessment process now comes under.  This is true 
even though the TACC in each of the fisheries has changed very little in percentage 
terms since first introduced.   
 
Noting that QMS has been largely successful for management of these rock lobster 
fisheries, it is important to note that the failure of the previous management systems 
cannot be solely attributed to the fact that they were input managed.  For example, 
senior South Australian research scientists believe that the over-reliance on catch per 
unit effort data obtained from the industry in the stock assessment for the northern 
zone fishery process was a major contributing factor.   
 
Without exception, compliance was identified as an issue and there are two key 
elements: (i) accountability of the catch recording system for the licensed commercial 
fishers; and (ii) illegal take by unlicensed operators for black markets.  A successful 
compliance program needs to have strategies to address both of these risks.  The 
temptation to focus on tracing the catch of licensed commercial operators could result 
in the expansion of black market activity – undermining the entire management 
process. 
 
On the face of it, it is possible to design a compliance program to meet both 
challenges by balancing the mix of compliance activities and supporting these 
strategies with sensible regulation.  For example rules that require processors to be 
licensed and limit points of landing are useful.  Interestingly, VMS was recognised 
universally as a most valuable tool yet it is not being utilised.   
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The level of information available to the delegation on the cost of managing the 
fisheries under QMS varied and was not complete.  However, the clear indication 
from fisheries managers and industry alike was that the greatest cost burden is 
experienced in the first few years as the fishery goes through a transition to a QMS.  
The experience has been that the most significant cost impact has come from 
compliance and, to a lesser extent, research. 
Industry dynamics and fishing patterns 
 
The response of industry to the introduction of a QMS with respect to its behaviour 
was an area of particular interest to the. 
 
The first point of interest is that for three of the four fisheries there was recognition, 
either explicitly or implicitly, that prior to entering the QMS there was over-capacity 
and that the new system should facilitate fleet restructure.  Accordingly, in New 
Zealand, Tasmania and the Northern Zone South Australian Fishery, there has been a 
reduction in both boat numbers and the number of entities owning quota units.   
 
The key elements present for each of the fisheries where there has been a significant 
level of restructuring are: (i) a TACC that constrains catch and in doing so created or 
exacerbated fleet over-capacity – the greater the imbalance, the greater the force for 
restructuring; and (ii) a system that allows a market for units of entitlement to 
function relatively freely.   
 
The rate at which the fleet adjusts following the introduction of a QMS is a separate 
issue, and most likely depends on the extent to which the management system limits 
aggregation of quota units and the degree to which the initial allocation of quota 
redistributed catch.   
 
When considering the Southern Zone South Australian Fishery, where there has not 
been any significant change in fleet size, it is apparent that the economic forces that 
would drive the fleet to restructure can be considerably dampened by regulation 
designed to prevent aggregation.  In this case, it is also relevant to note that at the time 
the fishery moved into QMS, the market for southern rock lobster was particularly 
buoyant and the industry was highly profitable. 
 
This combination of events has created an environment in which participants in the 
fishery have a particularly good lifestyle.  The price for this lifestyle is a relatively 
constrained quota market, and the risk is that the fundamentals that underpin the 
economics of the fishery change while regulation inhibits the industry’s ability to 
adjust in order to maintain profitability. 
 
As trading and leasing in quota (and pots within the Australian fisheries) has 
occurred, the value of entitlement increased, and increased quite rapidly.  The rapid 
increase in the value of entitlement is a function of demand.  The demand to buy and 
lease quota immediately following the introduction of a QMS is spurred by the need 
for participants to adjust the volume of catch to the size of their operation.  It is also 
apparent that the improving health of the fisheries under QMS and the resultant 
increase in catch rates improved profitability and added confidence to the market. 
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The trade in quota is mostly fuelled by people leaving the fishery and, to date, the 
majority of investment in quota entitlements has come from within the existing rights 
holders.  These investors are typically “topping up” their own operations or putting 
quota into the lease market.  Retiring fishers who choose not to sell their stake in the 
fishery further supply the lease market.  Across all of the fisheries, it is apparent that 
the profitability of fishing is less for a fishermen who leases entitlement as opposed to 
an owner/operator.   
 
The growing presence of lease fishermen (quota catchers) in these fisheries has both 
fisheries managers and industry leaders concerned that those who are employed to 
catch the lobster do not have a stake in the fishery and therefore do not act as stewards 
of the resource. 
 
The development of the Chinese live market for southern rock lobster in the 1990s 
resulted in very high prices being realised during the southern hemisphere winter.  
This coincided with a move to QMS for all but the Northern Zone South Australian 
Fishery.  In the QMS fisheries, there is a change in fishing patterns.  Industry has 
moved (to varying extents) away from targeting high catch rate periods and landing a 
variety of lobster with respect to size and colour, to an industry that increasingly 
supplies a size and colour of lobster to the market when the market is prepared to pay 
the highest price. 
 
This change in fishing strategy has occurred because the rush to fish no longer exists 
and it is therefore possible for processors to provide direct market signals to 
fishermen through regular changes in beach price.  The change has been greatest in 
Tasmania and New Zealand where the fishing season is structured to allow for winter 
fishing and so that the quota year ends at a traditionally high catch rate period, giving 
fishers confidence that they will be able to take their full allocation.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Determining the Best Management System for the West Coast Rock 
Lobster Fishery 
 
This paper sets out the process under which an assessment of the current management 
system for the West Coast Rock Lobster Managed Fishery against two alternate 
approaches is to occur. 
 
The first thing you will notice is that this is not going to be a rushed process.  In fact 
the process will occur in three distinct phases set to conclude by the end of 2006.  
That’s three years for you to fully understand the issues and the implications of the 
three management scenarios and reach a position on what you think is the best way to 
manage the fishery.   
 
What you will also notice is that the Government does not have a preconceived idea 
as to what is the best management scenario.  The Government is investing in a three-
year consultation process so that at the end of it you will have been provided with all 
the information you need to make your own mind up about what is the best 
management system for your fishery.   
 
To enable you to express your opinion on the future management of the Fishery there 
will be a formal poll towards the end of the three-year process.  The Western Rock 
Lobster Council will have a key coordinating role in getting industry stakeholders to 
express an educated opinion.   
 
It is important to note that the results of this poll will not necessarily determine 
Government’s final position.  The poll will make it clear to Government what the 
majority view of stakeholders is, but as per normal government process the ultimate 
decision will need to be made based on the substantial merits of the case for or against 
significant change.  A case for change would need to produce convincing arguments 
that there are material benefits in an Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) 
context to be realised under a new system of management. 
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Why are we considering changes?  Doesn’t the system we have work OK? 
 
The management arrangements in place for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery 
have been lauded around the world as best practice fisheries management – for 
example it is the world’s first fishery to be certified by the Marine Stewardship 
Council.  Because of the fishery’s solid foundations (i.e. long-term resource 
sustainability) it continues to attract investment in infrastructure, technology and 
personnel while also providing the impetus for the development of some significant 
Western Australian industries such as boat and shipbuilding.   
 
In fact it may well be demonstrated as a result of this process that the current system 
is the best way to manage the fishery!  However, at this stage it is not possible to 
assume that the current management package is the best way to manage the fishery 
and therefore it is important that the fishery undergo a process to evaluate the current 
system against other management strategies. 
 
The National Competition Policy (NCP) is providing the immediate need for this 
review, and the NCP test of legislation is founded on economic principles.  However, 
we know that the pursuit of economic ideals alone is not an appropriate basis for 
managing a fishery, clearly there is a need to consider and accommodate ecological 
and social objectives. 
 
For this reason it is important that if this assessment process is going to produce 
results that are truly in the better interests of the Western Australian community that it 
have an objective that is consistent with the principles of ESD, which are entrenched 
in fisheries resource management policy in Australia.   
 
In Australia, ESD is widely recognised as a natural resource management philosophy 
that seeks to provide balance to the competing ecological, social and economic 
objectives associated with the utilisation of renewable resources.   
 
By meeting the ecological management standards set by the Environmental Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC) and the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) it is reasonable to state that the “ecological leg” of ESD is being satisfied and 
will continue to be satisfied regardless of the management system employed.   
 
This being the case, the assessment process about to occur should treat the need for 
good ecological management practices as an essential requirement for any scenario 
under consideration.  With appropriate wording in the objective, this assumption 
allows the focus of the assessment to be on the economic and social legs of ESD, 
which is potentially where the greatest room for improvement exists.   
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In this context the objective for the assessment process should be: 
 
To investigate alternative management strategies using the current management 
package as the benchmark with a view to providing the best long-term socio-
economic return to the State from the ecologically sustainable use of the western 
rock lobster resource by:  
 
a. providing the greatest incentives and opportunity for growth in economic 
return from all sectors of the rock lobster industry to Western Australia; and  
b. in the context of providing a net socio-economic benefit to the Western 
Australian community, encourage the maintenance and development of 
regional communities.   
 
What are the management scenarios to be considered? 
 
There are three management scenarios that need to be equally assessed side by side 
noting that there is potential for the scenarios to be varied with the inclusion of greater 
detail as required.  A brief description of the scenarios follows. 
 
1. status quo 
 
The system we have today.  Based on limiting the number of pots that can 
be fished in each zone, a range of biological controls and a limited season, 
today commercial utilisation of the rock lobster resource is sustainable.  It 
should be noted this system could be adapted over time as necessary.   
 
2. An individually transferable effort system 
 
A system that would still be based on limiting the number of pots that 
could be fished in each zone and biological controls but could have more 
flexibility for individual operators to choose when they fish and how much 
gear they use at different times of the year.  In other words a management 
system based on their being a quota on time and effort with the ability to 
set the Total Allowable Effort based on sustainability needs.   
 
3. An individually transferable quota system 
 
A system whereby units have a value in kilograms of lobster that can be 
taken and the unit value equates to a Total Allowable Commercial Catch 
and biological controls remain to ensure the breeding stock is not at risk.  
A system that has the potential to provide the greatest freedom to operators 
in terms of when they choose to harvest their share of the catch.   
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Process for Assessing the Scenarios 
 
 Jan 04 –June 05 July 05 – 
Dec 05 
Jan 05 – Oct 
06 
Phase 1 
Objective analysis of 
management scenarios 
   
Phase 2 
Communicate analysis of 
management scenarios with 
stakeholders 
   
Phase 3 
Poll of stakeholder views & 
RLIAC prepare advice for 
Government 
   
 
Phase 1 – Objective analysis of management scenarios 
 
Commencing in January 2004 a joint Department and industry Steering Committee 
chaired by Mr Ron Edwards is to oversee the development of a series of papers that 
are to in an integrated manner objectively assess the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the three management scenarios with respect to the established 
objective.  The areas of study that need to be covered are: 
 
1. Cost efficiency comparisons of the three management scenarios 
 
A cost benefit analysis of the three management scenarios focusing on cost 
of fisheries management (including assessment of risk of biological or 
management failure), cost of production and the identification of economic 
opportunities that could only be realised under alternate management 
systems. 
 
2. Assessment of market development / advantage opportunities under each of 
the management scenarios 
 
Building on an initiative to establish a global lobster market database, 
analysis of what market development or market advantage opportunities 
could be realised under alternate management systems beyond what could 
occur under the existing system. 
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3. Assessment of the likely impacts on social infrastructure of the management 
options 
 
Through the establishment of appropriate indicators develop a conceptual 
model to predict the behaviour of industry under the various management 
options and therefore the impact of the expected behaviour on existing 
host communities. 
 
4. Assessment of other management systems from other jurisdictions 
 
Building on work already completed, review and update the current 
experience in places such as New Zealand, South Australia, Tasmania and 
Victoria. 
 
The Steering Committee is responsible for guiding the respective authors of these 
studies to ensure the work produced does in fact address the established objective.  
This study period would occur over a 12-month period with the aim of releasing 
papers around May 2005. 
 
Phase 2 – Communicate analysis of management scenarios with stakeholders 
 
With the various studies complete and published the second phase would commence 
in July 2005.   
 
The sole purpose of phase 2 is to communicate with stakeholders (primarily industry) 
as to what the objective analysis of the three management scenarios is saying in the 
context of the benchmark objective so that stakeholders are empowered to arrive at 
their own conclusions as to which option is best. 
 
The communication process would be based around a series of workshop sessions 
with professional fishermen’s associations and other interested parties.  It is desirable 
that someone who understands fisheries management issues and is independent of 
both the Department and the industry facilitate these workshops.   
 
The importance of the role to be played by professional fishermen’s associations, the 
Western Rock Lobster Council and the Western Rock Lobster Development 
Association in this phase cannot be overstated.  There is an opportunity for industry 
leaders to facilitate and guide industry’s discovery of the issues and development of a 
position in such a way as to enhance the prospect of a very positive outcome.   
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Phase 3 – RLIAC prepare advice for Government 
 
At the commencement of the third phase stakeholders will have been exposed to 
numerous education and awareness processes based around the four key studies.  At 
this point stakeholders should be in a position to express their views on where the true 
strengths and weaknesses of the three management scenarios lie and on balance which 
is the best option.   
 
In this period RLIAC will receive submissions from stakeholders and engage with 
stakeholders to clarify positions and bring together the combination of stakeholder 
submissions and results of the four key studies to develop advice to Government.  
RLIAC will continue to communicate with stakeholders throughout this period to 
ensure its understanding of the respective stakeholder positions are well understood. 
 
At this point the Western Rock Lobster Council will also coordinate a poll of industry 
to ascertain what the weight of opinion with respect to the management scenarios is.   
 
It is important to note that the results of this poll will not necessarily determine 
Government’s final position.  The poll will make it clear to Government what the 
majority view of stakeholders is, but as per normal government process the ultimate 
decision will need to be made based on the substantial merits of the case for or against 
significant change.  A case for change would need to produce convincing arguments 
that there are material benefits in an ESD context to be realised under a new system of 
management. 
 
By October 2006 RLIAC will be in a position to formally communicate the substance 
of the committee’s intended advice to Government on the coastal tour before formally 
presenting this advice.  This final step provides further transparency for the process 
and the opportunity for RLIAC to ensure its assessment of the respective scenarios 
has properly accounted for the various views and is on balance the best advice.   
 
What happens from there? 
 
Once the Minister has received RLIAC’s advice he will take the merits of the position 
reached to Cabinet.  Cabinet’s view on the long-term management of the rock lobster 
fishery in the context of ESD and NCP is likely to be known early in 2007 and it is at 
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Appendix 2 
 
Focus Questions relating to Western Rock Lobster Delegation to New Zealand 




The broad objective of the project, of which our visit is a part, is to determine the best 
system of management for the commercial harvest of western rock lobsters.  Although 
we recognise the importance of management dealing with all sources of exploitation, 
our primary interest in this instance is to better understand the benefits and 
shortcomings of the system in place for managing the commercial component of other 
rock lobster fisherys 
 
The impetus for this review comes from a Federal Australian Policy known as 
National Competition Policy.  This policy assumes that competition is good, and that 
anti-competitive regulation should be removed unless it can be demonstrated that it is 
in the public benefit to retain certain regulation.  Furthermore, the current system of 
management has been in place for quite some time and has largely remained 
unchanged for a decade.  The West Australian Government is keen to know if this 
system is still the best system for achieving the optimum commercial use of the 




1. What has been the cost of running the fishery with respect to management, 
compliance and research? 
 
2. Can the cost of management be expressed as a percentage of gross value of 
production or $/kg (something else)? 
 
3. Has the cost been increasing, decreasing or consistent with CPI?  Can cost 
changes be attributed to specific initiatives, policies or management demands? 
 
4. What are the critical elements of the management program that are necessary 
to mitigate against management failure? 
 
Socio -Economic Performance 
 
1. Are there studies or information available on the changes overtime in the 
economic performance of the fishery?   
 
2. Has there been any data collected or analysis of the broader social benefits that 
are provide by the fishery?  Is there any comparative information available 
prior to the implementation of the QMS? 
 
3. Are there identifiable “fishing communities” or is the economic and social 
fabric of communities typically mixed? 
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4. Is there information available on cost of production?  Alternately is there 
information available on key inputs to the fishing operation such as:  
 
• bait and fuel use per kg of lobster, 
• number of people employed by the catching sector and by the processing 
sector, 
• cost of gear and life expectancy, 
• investment in capital required 
 
5. Of particular interest is any analysis of whether the management system 
provides incentives with respect to cost of production and investment in 
infrastructure. 
 
6. What kind of work force does the fishery (catching and processing) employ – 
fulltime, part-time or casual?  Do they seek other forms of employment to 
supplement their rock lobster income? 
 
7. Has the harvest strategy evolved over time and to what extent has any change 
been influenced by cost of production incentives in the management system 
versus seasonal influences? 
 
8. Are rock lobster fishermen and their fishing capital involved in other 
businesses, eg charter, other fisheries or non-fishing related?  Has it always 
been this way?  
 
9. What comments can you make about the fleet dynamics overtime?   
 
10. From an investment perspective do you think that the fishery has evolved 
differently or more rapidly under the QMS then it would have otherwise? 
 
11. What is the mix between owner-operator versus investment based operations?  
Is it moving one way or the other?  If there is a trend, does it impact on the 
risk of management failure positively or negatively?  Furthermore does the 
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